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In late June 2013, the city of Louisville, Kentucky, announced plans to provide
restaurant health inspection data to Yelp.com for publication on their popular online
consumer-review forum. These data were already publicly available on the city’s web-
site. I utilize this partnership to test whether an increase in the salience of disclosed
quality information on a particular product attribute, induces sellers to improve prod-
uct quality along that dimension. Consumers use Yelp to gather information on many
characteristics of a restaurant’s product. Consumers depend less on Yelp to learn about
chain-affiliated restaurants, because much of this information is conveyed through the
chain’s reputation. Using data from over 11,000 Louisville restaurant health inspec-
tions, I compare health inspection performance for independent and chain-affiliated
restaurants, before and after the announcement of the partnership. Controlling for a
variety of factors, I estimate that this increased salience caused substantial improve-
ment in independent restaurant hygiene. The average treatment effect is estimated
to be a 12-14% decrease in health score point deductions, and a 29-37% decrease in
critical violations (those deemed to be the greatest public health risk), per inspection.
The effect of the Louisville-Yelp partnership on health score point deductions is en-
tirely evident in restaurants’ first inspections following its announcement, where the
estimated effect is a 14-16% relative decrease.
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1 Introduction
Foodborne illness is a persistent public health issue in the United States. In 2011, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that foodborne illness makes
48 million Americans (about 1 in every 6) sick every year, resulting in roughly 128,000 hos-
pitalizations, and 3,000 deaths.1 Moreover, the CDC estimates that in 2013, restaurants
accounted for 60 percent of the foodborne illness outbreaks in the US that had a single
known food preparation source.2
Jin and Leslie (2003) find that the display of hygiene grade cards in restaurant windows,
which was required by Los Angeles County in 1998, corresponded with a 5.3 percent increase
in restaurant inspection scores, suggesting that restaurants improved hygiene quality in re-
sponse to the policy change. Restaurant hygiene is an example of a product attribute for
which a mandatory disclosure policy should motivate sellers to improve quality. All else the
same, consumers likely prefer restaurants with better hygiene, but substantial information
asymmetries exist. Save for extremes, variation in hygiene across restaurants is typically
imperceptible to consumers, both before and after purchase. By reducing these information
asymmetries, mandatory disclosure of hygiene information should result in consumers substi-
tuting toward cleaner restaurants. In anticipation of (or reaction to) this consumer response,
restaurants with poorer hygiene should invest in improving hygiene quality. Also, in light
of consumers being better informed of hygiene quality, cleaner restaurants should attempt
to at least maintain their existing levels of cleanliness. Moreover, cleaner restaurants with
anything less than a perfect hygiene rating may expect that mandatory disclosure increases
the marginal benefit of improving hygiene, and also invest in doing so.
In light of the aforementioned statistics, and because foodborne illness due to improper
food handling/preparation/storage can be prevented, the Jin and Leslie (2003) result makes
mandatory disclosure policies an understandably attractive regulatory tool. If effective in
1See http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html.
2See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2013), or http://www.cdc.gov/features/
foodborne-diseases-data/.
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inducing this salutary seller response, mandatory disclosure policies would seem a relatively
inexpensive method for improving the quality of certain product attributes (like, e.g., safety)
in a variety of industries.3 However, unlike the salutary seller response found by Jin and
Leslie (2003), Ho (2012) finds that similar policies in San Diego and New York had no effect
on restaurant hygiene or the incidence of foodborne illness, making the evidence regarding
the effectiveness of such policies mixed. It is important to remember that these mandatory
disclosure policies, and the regulatory regimes implementing them, are not identical. More-
over, seller response will depend on the extent to which a given disclosure policy reduces
the existing information asymmetries. Thus, seller response to mandatory disclosure may
depend on many aspects of a given policy, especially the manner in which the disclosed
information is presented to the public.
In this paper, I exploit a partnership between Yelp.com, a popular online consumer-review
forum, and the city of Louisville, Kentucky, to test the impact of information salience (i.e.,
the prominence/visibility to consumers of disclosed information when they make decisions)
on the provision of product quality by sellers. Disclosed product quality information may not
factor in consumer decisions if it is relatively costly to acquire or difficult to process,4 and
information salience has been found to affect consumer choices in a variety of settings (see
e.g., Chetty et al. (2009), Bollinger et al. (2011), or Luca and Smith (2013)). The desired
seller response to mandatory disclosure will be diminished or absent if sellers suspect that
consumers will remain uninformed even after product quality information has been disclosed.
As such, information salience may be an important consideration in the design of mandatory
disclosure policies, and the effectiveness of existing disclosure policies may be improved with
modifications aimed at increasing the salience of already-disclosed information.
In late June of 2013, the city of Louisville, Kentucky, announced plans to provide restau-
3Presumably, this is relatively less expensive than measures which would require the employment of
additional inspectors, like increasing the frequency or duration of routine inspections.
4This information may be costly to acquire if consumers must go inside the establishment, or search
city/county websites to learn about a restaurant’s most recent health inspection. The information may be
difficult to process if the scale or criteria for scoring are unclear, or if there is little variation in scores across
restaurants.
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rant health inspection data to Yelp.com for publication on their website. At that time, the
information was already publicly available on the city’s website, and had been for several
years. Thus, the partnership between Louisville and Yelp did not change the extent of restau-
rant hygiene information available to consumers. Rather, it increased the salience of this
information for consumers using Yelp when deciding where to eat. Many such consumers
would, as a result of the partnership, become informed of restaurants’ hygiene despite visit-
ing Yelp with no intention of acquiring such information.
I use the partnership between Louisville and Yelp to test how sellers of a multi-attribute
good (food service), respond to the increased salience of information regarding a particu-
lar attribute of their product (hygiene). Variation in information salience results from the
fact that, with regard to collecting information on restaurants, consumer use of Yelp has
been shown to focus predominately on “independent” restaurants (those not affiliated with
a chain).5 In other words, the increased salience of hygiene information is greater for in-
dependent restaurants, because consumers are less likely to look up, for example, an Olive
Garden or T.G.I. Friday’s on Yelp.
Consumers use Yelp to gather information on multiple characteristics of a restaurant’s
product, such as food quality, types of dishes, prices, and so on. The restaurant chain
however, by conferring the reputation of a brand upon member establishments, predates
Yelp as a mechanism for conveying such information. Therefore, Yelp’s primary benefit to
consumers (the provision of product quality information) is diminished with regard to chain-
affiliated restaurants, and consumer use of Yelp to collect restaurant information should
focus mostly on independent establishments, which do not share the reputation of a national
or regional chain. Thus, compared to chain-affiliated restaurants, revenue for independent
restaurants will be more sensitive to information published on Yelp, all else the same. Luca
(2016) empirically documents this by showing that although revenue for independent restau-
rants in Seattle, Washington, is very sensitive to their Yelp consumer ratings, revenue for
5See Luca (2016).
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chain restaurants is effectively unresponsive to changes in their Yelp rating.6 So while the
Louisville-Yelp partnership may increase the salience of hygiene information for all Louisville
restaurants, the increase should be largest for independent restaurants. Similarly, while this
policy change may increase the sensitivity of revenue to health inspection performance for all
Louisville restaurants, the increase in sensitivity will be greater for independent restaurants
than for those with chain affiliations.
Empirically, I collect detailed data from more than 11,000 Louisville Metro Department
of Health and Wellness (DHW hereafter) restaurant inspections, which span January 2011
to January 2016.7 I estimate the effect of the increased information salience on restaurant
hygiene using a difference-in-differences approach. I compare the health inspection perfor-
mances of independent and chain-affiliated restaurants, before and after the announcement
of the Louisville-Yelp partnership (LYP hereafter), and find that the increased information
salience led to substantial hygiene improvements. Controlling for a variety of restaurant and
inspection-specific factors such as the age of the restaurant, the day of the week, and the
inspector conducting the inspection, I estimate that the increased salience caused about a
12 to 14 percent relative decrease in point deductions (from a 100 point inspection score)
among independent restaurants. The effect on deducted points is largest in restaurants’ first
inspections following the announcement of the LYP, where there is a relative decrease among
independent restaurants of anywhere from 14 to 16 percent, and after which there are only
slight fluctuations.
I also assess the effect of the LYP on “critical” violations of the Louisville DHW health
code, because these are the violations that the DHW deems most likely to cause foodborne
illness. Using the same estimation approach employed with deducted points, I estimate that
over the course of July 2013 to January 2016, the LYP led to a 29 to 37 percent relative
6By exploiting discontinuities created by Yelp’s rounding of average ratings to the nearest half-star, Luca
estimates that a one-star increase in Yelp rating causes a 5 to 9 percent relative increase in revenue for
independent restaurants in Seattle. However, a one-star change in Yelp rating has a statistically insignificant
and very small effect on revenue for chain-affiliated restaurants.
7This the effective span of the data on restaurant inspections. There are, however, 9 observations which
come from 2007 to 2010.
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decrease in critical violations per inspection among independent restaurants. Given that
critical violations carry the highest probability of causing foodborne illness, these results are
especially striking.
In the space that follows, I review the announcement and nature of the LYP, and the
data used in this paper. This is proceeded by a discussion of my estimation strategy and
tests of the assumptions that underly it. I then present the main results from estimation,
and conclude with several checks of the robustness of my main results.
2 Overview of the Louisville-Yelp Partnership
On June 26, 2013, the Louisville Mayor’s office issued a press release announcing that
Louisville was partnering with Yelp to incorporate restaurant health inspection scores into
their popular consumer-review site.8 At the time of the announcement, the plan was to begin
incorporating these scores later that same summer, and this was well underway by August of
2013.9 The Louisville Metro DHW conducts unannounced health inspections of restaurants
and other non-restaurant establishments which handle food (e.g. grocery stores or hospital
cafeterias). Inspectors record any detected violations of the health code, and restaurants are
then given a corresponding inspection score out of 100.
For the purposes of this paper, an important aspect of the LYP is that it did not change
the type or extent of hygiene quality information available to the public. The data provided
to Yelp by the Louisville DHW has been available online at the city’s open data portal
since 2011, and on the city’s website prior to that.10 Because health inspection histories
for restaurants were already publicly available, the LYP did not increase the provision of
restaurant hygiene information. Rather, it increased the salience of this information for
8The press release from the city of Louisville is found at http://www.gotolouisville.com/media/
news-releases/news-details/index.aspx?nid=978.
9See http://louisville.eater.com/2013.
10The city of Louisville open data portal is found online at http://portal.louisvilleky.gov/service/
data. Prior to the launch of the open data portal, restaurant inspection scores could be found at http:
//portal.louisvilleky.gov/applications/RestaurantInspectionScores.
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consumers who use Yelp when deciding where to eat.
Yelp publishes a Louisville restaurant’s most recent health inspection score on the top
page of an establishment’s review profile. This means that the most recent health inspection
score is prominently displayed, and visible when consumers first land on an establishment’s
Yelp profile. As seen in Figure 1, the most recent health inspection score is found in a box
on the right side of the profile’s top page. The restaurant’s hours of operation, price range,
and a link to their menu are found in this same box. Immediately to the right of the most
recent score is a hyper-link labeled “Health inspection”. Clicking on this hyper-link takes
consumers to a page like the one displayed in Figure 2. There, the date and type of the
establishment’s most recent health inspection are provided, along with a description of any
detected violations. Below that, the restaurant’s “Health Inspections” page gives a table
with similar information from their prior inspections.
It is worth emphasizing that it is a restaurant’s most recent inspection score as opposed
to an average score, that is posted on their Yelp profile, and that visitors must navigate to
a separate page to view a restaurant’s health inspection history. This means that regardless
of whether a restaurant’s health inspection history is good or poor, any future changes in
the hygiene quality information displayed atop their Yelp profile will be determined only by
their performance on their next inspection. Thus, for restaurants whose revenue is sensitive
to information on Yelp, the LYP should increase the expected cost of performing poorly on
their next health inspection, regardless of whether their health inspection history is good or
poor. This is because it will be the most recent score that most influences perceived hygiene
among visitors to a Yelp profile.
3 Data Collection and Sample Construction
The data used in this paper are collected from the city of Louisville’s online open data
portal.11 I merge information from the city’s datasets titled “health inspections”, “estab-
11The Louisville Metro Open Data Portal is referenced as Louisville Metro Government (2016).
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lishments”, and “inspection violations” to form my initial raw dataset of 36,821 total ob-
servations on 5,649 unique establishments. Each observation is an inspection conducted by
the Louisville DHW. Observations include the date of the inspection, the name of the estab-
lishment inspected, an identification number for the establishment, and the name, address,
opening year, number of seats, and type of the establishment. Observations also include the
number of violations detected, the restaurant’s overall inspection score (out of 100), and an
identification number for the DHW employee who conducted the inspection.
I clean and parse the raw data over several steps to arrive at the sample used in es-
timation. First, I keep observations from regular/routine inspections only, and drop all
observations from follow-up or other unconventional inspection types. This leaves data on
33,954 inspections conducted by the DHW on 5,442 different establishments. The raw data
from the city go back as early as 2006. However, observations on restaurants effectively begin
in 2011.12 I keep only observations from establishments that had at least two inspections
before the announcement of the LYP, and at least one inspection after. I mark the post-
announcement period as beginning July 1, 2013.13 This leaves 26,087 inspections conducted
on 3,159 establishments.
Within the remaining sample, there are a total of 11,424 observations on 1,259 different
restaurants. There are also 14,672 observations on 1,900 different non-restaurant establish-
ments. These non-restaurant observations are from establishments such as retail food stores,
hospital cafeterias, food processing plants, charitable food kitchens, et cetera. The primary
sample used in estimation consists of observations on restaurants only. As a robustness
check, estimates are repeated with observations from some of the non-restaurant establish-
ments included to create alternative comparison groups.
In Louisville, food service establishments are supposed to receive routine or “regular” in-
spections every 180 days, approximately. Naturally, restaurant inspections within the sample
12There are 9 observations on restaurants prior to 2011: 2 in 2007, 1 in 2008, 3 in 2009, and 3 in 2010.
13Although the city’s statement was released Wednesday June 26, 2013, I mark the post-announcement
period as beginning the following Monday, to allow for this information to spread.
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often occur at intervals substantially shorter or longer than 180 days, presumably, to prevent
restaurants from anticipating when their next inspection will occur. Among 10,158 obser-
vations on restaurants, the average elapsed time between inspections is 191.24 days, with a
standard deviation of 55.29 days.14 “Follow-up” inspections occur after a restaurant fails a
routine inspection. They are conducted at the request of the restaurant, and are supposed
to occur within 10 business days (14 days total) of the request for a follow-up inspection. A
routine inspection is failed if a restaurant has committed a critical violation or receives an
overall inspection score below 85 (out of 100).
Among the remaining 11,424 inspections of restaurants, I identify 25 observations which
appear to have been follow-up inspections that were miscoded as regular inspections. Among
the 10,158 observations where this information is available, there are only 26 inspections
which occurred within 16 days of the restaurants’ previous inspections, 25 of which followed
failed inspections. That is, the inspections preceding these 26 observations were failed at a
frequency of 0.9615. Among all 10,158 observations, inspections are failed at a frequency of
0.0668. In light of that severe contrast, and because they meet the Louisville DHW definition
of follow-up inspections, I exclude the 25 inspections which occurred within 16 days of failed
inspections.15 The exclusion of these observations leaves a final sample of 11,399 restaurant
inspections.
For each observation, my data include the number of detected violations, as well as an
overall inspection score. Violations are categorized as critical and non-critical, with critical
violations being those deemed to pose more serious health risks. The inspection score is a
function of the number critical and non-critical violations detected. No detected violations
of any type results in a maximum score of 100. Each non-critical violation results in a 1
or 2 point deduction, and each critical violation results in a 4 or 5 point deduction. This
relationship between critical violations, non-critical violations, and overall inspection score
14For restaurants’ initial observations in the sample, the time elapsed because their prior inspections is
unobserved, hence the 10,158 observations.
15Note also, that 16 days elapsed because previous inspection lies about 3.17 standard deviations away
from the mean, and 99.74 percent of the 10,158 observations on days elapsed were greater than 16 days.
8
is presented in Figure 3. It is important to note that for a given violation of the health
code, there is a prescribed point deduction. Thus, for a given set of detected violations, the
inspector has no discretion over the score assigned to the restaurant.
The inspection score, because it weights different violations according to the health risk
they pose, is a more informative measure of restaurant hygiene than a simple count of de-
tected violations. Inspection score is bounded from above at 100. However, this is not the
result of truncation or censorship. Rather, an inspection score of 100 results from an obser-
vation of 0 violations, and thus, 0 points deducted from a score of 100. For this reason, I
use deducted points as the primary dependent variable in my empirical analyses. Figure 4
shows the distribution of deducted points among the final sample.
Among the final sample of restaurants, I use establishment names to account for which
restaurants are chain-affiliated and which are independent. A complete list of the establish-
ment names sorted as chain-affiliated is provided in Tables A9 and A10 of the Appendix.
The final sample includes 4,992 observations on 534 chain-affiliated restaurants, and 6,407
observations on 725 independent restaurants. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Identifying Seller Response to Changes in Information Salience
To identify the effect of information salience on restaurant hygiene, I compare the health
inspection performances of independent and chain-affiliated restaurants, before and after
the announcement of the LYP. This exploits the underlying difference in the salience of
information on Yelp between independent and chain-affiliated restaurants.
My initial outcome variable, DeductedP tsi,t, denotes the number of points deducted
(from 100) for restaurant i during their tth inspection of the sample. I begin by estimating the
effect of the LYP on restaurant hygiene with simple difference-in-differences. These estimates
of deducted points per inspection, before and after the LYP announcement, are provided in
9
Table 2. They show that, even before accounting for any other restaurant or inspection-
specific characteristics which might affect inspection scores, the LYP is estimated to cause
an 11.12 percent relative decrease in deducted points among independent restaurants.
To control for a variety of characteristics which may affect deducted points, I specify the
following linear model:
DeductedP tsi,t = β1(Posti,t × INDi) + β2Posti,t + β3ti,t +Xi,t′β + bi + i,t. (1)
INDi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if restaurant i is independent (i.e. not affiliated
with a chain), and equal to 0 if restaurant i is chain-affiliated. Posti,t is an indicator equal
to 1 if the tth inspection for restaurant i occurs after the LYP announcement, and equal to 0
otherwise. The variable ti,t is a linear trend equal to t in the t
th inspection of the sample for
restaurant i. The vector Xi,t includes several restaurant and inspection-specific controls.
Under an initial specification, the restaurant-specific controls inXi,t are INDi, the estab-
lishment’s logged number of seats, and fixed effects for the year in which the establishment
opened, and the restaurant’s zip code.16 The inspection-specific controls included in the
initial specification are the logged age of the restaurant at the time of the inspection,17 and
indicators for the day of the week in which the inspection occurred, and the inspector who
conducted the inspection. Recall that t denotes a restaurant’s tth inspection in the sample.
However, my data include many restaurants which opened before the start of the sample.
Because these restaurants’ first inspections in the sample are likely not their first inspections
ever, I include logged age to account for changes in DeductedP tsi,t over time that are asso-
ciated with a restaurant’s experience, and thus, not accounted for by ti,t. Under this initial
specification, which does not include restaurant fixed effects, Xi,t includes an intercept term.
Under my preferred specification for equation (1), I replace all time-invariant controls in
16In my data, the number of seats is time invariant for all restaurants. Thus, it is only a restaurant-specific,
as opposed to an inspection-specific, characteristic.
17Age is measured in years and starts at 1. That is, when a restaurant opens, and is in their first year of
operation, their age is counted as 1.
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Xi,t with restaurant fixed effects. I also estimate equation (1) under a third specification in
which two additional controls are added. One, DiffInspector i,t, is an indicator equal to 1 if
the inspector conducting the tth inspection for restaurant i, is different than the inspector
who conducted the restaurant’s (t − 1)th inspection. I include DiffInspector i,t because Jin
and Lee (2014a) and Jin and Lee (2014b), which study restaurant inspections in Florida, find
evidence that inspectors who did not conduct a restaurant’s previous inspection, detect more
violations. The other control included in this third specification is the logged value of the
number of days elapsed since a restaurant’s last inspection. A drawback to this specification
is that for all observations where t = 1, the values of both of these additional controls are
unknown, and these observations must be dropped in estimation.18 Thus, the second spec-
ification discussed is the preferred specification. However, this third specification produces
similar estimates for the parameter of interest, β1.
Finally, because DeductedP tsi,t is discrete and non-negative, I also estimate these spec-
ifications under a Poisson model. Both the linear and Poisson models produce very simi-
lar results. Before proceeding to these results, I provide evidence supporting the “parallel
trends” assumption that underlies this identification strategy.
4.2 Testing Underlying Assumptions
An assumption underlying my empirical approach is that, in the absence of the LYP,
deducted points among independent and chain-affiliated restaurants would have maintained
a common pre-existing trend after June of 2013 (when the LYP was announced). To as-
sess the validity of this assumption, I test whether deducted points among independent and
chain-affiliated restaurants followed similar trends in the inspections leading up to the an-
nouncement of the LYP. Specifically, I provide several pieces of graphical and regression-based
evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption: that deducted points among indepen-
dent and chain-affiliated restaurants followed parallel trends before the LYP announcement,
18Even for restaurants whose first inspection in the sample is not their first inspection ever, the values of
both controls are still unknown.
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and would have maintained these parallel trends had the LYP not been implemented.
First, I present graphical evidence that deducted points among these two groups followed
stable and similar trends prior to the LYP announcement. In Figure 5, I plot the average
deducted points for independent and chain-affiliated restaurants in inspections around the
LYP announcement. On the horizontal axis, the value 0 represents a restaurant’s last inspec-
tion prior to the announcement, -1 represents a restaurant’s second-to-last inspection prior
to the announcement, and so on. The value 1 represents a restaurant’s first inspection after
the announcement, 2 represents a restaurant’s second inspection after the announcement,
and so on. Notice that even before controlling for other restaurant or inspection-specific
characteristics, the average deducted points for independent and chain-affiliated restaurants
follow stable pre-announcement paths that appear fairly similar. However, because these
simple averages omit many variables that might affect deducted points, I assess the trends in
deducted points for independent and chain-affiliated restaurants after controlling for several
restaurant and inspection-specific characteristics.
I regress DeductedP tsi,t on several controls. The restaurant-specific controls are the es-
tablishment’s logged number of seats, and indicators for the year in which the restaurant
opened. Inspection-specific controls are the logged age of the restaurant at the time of the
inspection, and indicators for the day of the week, and the inspector conducting the inspec-
tion. Figure 6 compares the residuals of this regression, averaged by inspections around
the LYP announcement, for independent and chain-affiliated restaurants. Notice that the
residuals for both independent and chain-affiliated restaurants are on very stable and similar
trends prior to the announcement.
Figures 5 and 6 provide initial support for the parallel trends assumption, however, sta-
tistical tests of this assumption are also desirable. To test for the existence of different
pre-announcement trends, I generate a variable, Ti,t, which is a trend variable defined using
the LYP announcement as a reference point (as opposed to ti,t, where a restaurant’s first
inspection in the sample is the reference point). Ti,t equals 1 in a restaurant’s fifth inspection
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prior to the LYP announcement, and equals 1 +n in a restaurant’s nth inspection after that.
Thus, for all restaurants in the sample, Ti,t equals 5 in their last inspection before the LYP
announcement, 6 in their first inspection after the LYP announcement, and so on. Using
observations from the pre-announcement period only, I estimate the following equation:
DeductedP tsi,t = α1(Ti,t × INDi,t) + α2Ti,t +Xi,t′α+ ai + ui,t. (2)
Under the null hypothesis that deducted points for independent and chain-affiliated restau-
rants followed parallel trends prior to the LYP announcement, α1 = 0. I test for violations of
this assumption by estimating equation (2) under the same three specifications discussed in
section 4.1. I also estimate this equation under a simple specification where Xi,t is dropped
entirely.
Estimates of equation (2) are presented in Table 3. Notice that under all specifica-
tions, the pre-announcement trend for independent restaurants is not significantly different
from the pre-announcement trend among chain-affiliated restaurants. Therefore, all four
specifications fail to reject the null hypothesis that deducted points for independent and
chain-affiliated restaurants followed parallel trends prior to the LYP announcement.
Although the evidence just presented supports the existence of parallel pre-announcement
trends across inspections, I also test whether differential quarter-year or half-year trends
might have existed between independent and chain-affiliated restaurants in the pre-announcement
period. Let Qi,t denote the quarter-year in which the t
th inspection of restaurant i occurred.
I augment equation (2) as follows:
DeductedP tsi,t = α1Qi,t + α2(Qi,t × INDi,t) +Xi,t′α+ ai + ui,t. (3)
Using pre-announcement observations only, I estimate equation (3) under the same four
specifications as equation (2). These estimates are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix,
and all fail to reject the null hypothesis of parallel pre-announcement trends. I also estimate
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equation (3) under the same four specifications, with Half i,t replacing Qi,t. Half i,t denotes
the half-year in which the tth inspection of restaurant i occurred. These results are provided
in Table A2 of the Appendix. Again, there is no evidence of differential trends prior to the
announcement of the LYP. Given that none of these specifications are able to reject the par-
allel trends hypothesis, I am confident that my identification strategy, laid out in equation
(1), will not be confounded by different pre-announcement trends between independent and
chain-affiliated restaurants.
Recall that the parallel trends assumption is that, in the absence of the LYP, deducted
points among independent and chain-affiliated restaurants would have maintained a com-
mon pre-existing trend in the post-announcement period. The preceding evidence suggests
that a common pre-announcement trend existed between independent and chain-affiliated
restaurants. To provide further evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption, I ex-
amine whether deducted points among the chain-affiliated restaurants maintained their pre-
announcement trend in the post-announcement period. I do so by estimating the following
equation using both pre-announcement and post-announcement observations from chain-
affiliated restaurants only:
DeductedP tsi,t = α1(Ti,t × Posti,t) + α2Ti,t +Xi,t′α+ ai + ui,t. (4)
Under the null hypothesis that the pre-announcement trend among chain-affiliated restau-
rants was maintained in the post-announcement period, α1 = 0.
I estimate equation (4) under the same four specifications used for equation (2). These
estimates are reported in Table 4. Notice that across all four specifications, the coefficients
on (Ti,t × Posti,t) are small and statistically insignificant. These estimates fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the pre-announcement trend in deducted points among chain-affiliated
restaurants was maintained in the post-announcement period. These results lend further
support to the parallel trends assumption.
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Finally, I provide an additional piece of evidence supporting my empirical approach, in the
form of a specification check. Does the distinction between independent and chain-affiliated
restaurants capture an underlying difference in the salience of information on Yelp? That is,
do independent and chain-affiliated restaurants form good “treatment” and “control” groups
for estimating the effect of the LYP? To evaluate this question, I regress DeductedP tsi,t on
indicators for the day of the week in which an inspection occurred, the inspector conducting
the inspection, and the restaurant being inspected. In Figure 7, I plot residuals from this
regression averaged by the age of the restaurant at the time of an inspection, within four
groups. The upper panel of Figure 7 shows residuals among chain-affiliated restaurants, and
the lower panel shows residuals among independent restaurants. Within each panel, resid-
uals are then grouped by whether the restaurant was a given age before or after the LYP
announcement, and then averaged by age within those subgroups.
Notice from the upper panel of Figure 7 that among chain-affiliated restaurants, across
the different age groups, there is no discernible pattern to the difference in residuals before
and after the announcement, and in many age groups, the two averaged residuals are very
close to each other. However, notice from the lower panel that in every age group among
independent restaurants, the average pre-announcement residual is greater than the average
post-announcement residual. This shows that a distinction between the pre-announcement
and post-announcement periods identifies a stark difference in hygiene (in the expected di-
rection) among independent restaurants only. This supports the underlying assumption that
the LYP increased the salience of hygiene information among independent restaurants, but
that chain-affiliated restaurants are largely unaffected by, and thus largely unresponsive to,
information published on Yelp. Given all the evidence supporting my empirical approach, I
now proceed to my estimation results.
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5 Results
5.1 The Effect of Information Salience on Deducted Points
Table 5 presents linear model estimates of equation (1) under the three specifications
discussed in section 4.1. Standard errors are clustered at the restaurant level, and reported
in parentheses. Notice that the estimated average treatment effect of the LYP is statistically
significant, and similar in magnitude across all three specifications. Under the full speci-
fication, given in column (2), the average treatment effect is estimated to be a reduction
in deducted points per inspection of 0.6706, which is substantial (recall that a non-critical
violation results in a 1 or 2 point deduction). Estimates under this specification project a pre-
announcement average of 4.9037 deducted points among independent restaurants, suggesting
that the LYP led to a 13.68 percent relative decrease in deducted points per inspection.
Notice that under the specification reported in column (3), facing an inspector who did
not conduct the restaurant’s preceding inspection, is associated with a significant and sub-
stantial increase in point deductions. Specifically, an inspector who is different from the one
who last inspected a restaurant, is projected to deduct 11.12 percent more points than an
inspector on a repeat visit to an establishment. The sign, significance, and magnitude of this
result is very consistent with the findings of Jin and Lee (2014a) and Jin and Lee (2014b).
Jin and Lee (2014b) find that inspectors who are new to a restaurant detect 12.7 to 17.5
percent more violations than inspectors in their first repeat inspections of restaurants. They
attribute this result to “fresh eyes” better detecting violations.
To provide a slightly different frame of reference for interpreting these results, I estimate
equation (1) under the preferred specification, with the number of violations per inspection
replacing deducted points as the dependent variable. This regression produces a coefficient
on (Posti,t × INDi) of -0.3114 (nearly one third of a violation), which is statistically signif-
icant at the 99 percent significance level. This represents a 9.89 percent relative decrease in
violations per inspection among independent restaurants.
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Table A3 in the Appendix presents Poisson model estimates of equation (1). Standard er-
rors are robust to violations of the Poisson model’s equidispersion assumption, and reported
in parentheses. Again, estimates of the average treatment effect are statistically significant
and very similar in magnitude across all three specifications. These estimates are also very
similar to their corresponding linear model estimates in sign, significance, and magnitude.
These initial results suggest that the increased salience of hygiene information brought
about by the LYP, had a substantial effect on the average provision of hygiene quality by in-
dependent restaurants. After accounting for pre-announcement hygiene differences between
independent and chain-affiliated restaurants, the average treatment effect on deducted points
appears to be anywhere from a 12.34 to 13.68 percent relative decrease. Next, I assess the ef-
fect of the LYP specifically on health code violations which are very likely to cause foodborne
illness.
5.2 The Effect of Information Salience on Critical Violations. Did
the Partnership Reduce Serious Violations?
The initial estimates show that the LYP resulted in better overall inspection scores among
independent restaurants due to fewer health code violations. A related question then, is what
types of violations were detected at lower frequencies? Presumably, the goal of city and state
health codes and regular inspection of restaurants is to reduce the likelihood that diners will
contract foodborne illness in restaurants. Recall that DeductedP tsi,t accounts for both crit-
ical and non-critical violations of the Louisville health code, and weights those violations
according to severity (1 to 2 deducted points for non-critical violations, and 4 to 5 deducted
points for critical violations). Critical violations of the Louisville DHW health code are those
which pose high public health risks, and include: spoiled food, food stored at improper tem-
peratures, improper disposal of sewage and waste, improper dish and equipment washing,
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and personnel with infections not barred from working, among others.19 Because these criti-
cal violations are more likely to result in foodborne illnesses, the effect of information salience
on these more severe violations, is of particular interest.
To assess the effect of the LYP on high-risk restaurant hygiene practices, I estimate equa-
tion (1) with the number of detected critical violations (per inspection) replacingDeductedP tsi,t
as the dependent variable.20 These estimates under the linear model are presented in Table
6.21 Across all three specifications the estimated average treatment effect is statistically
significant. Under the preferred specification reported in column (2), the average treatment
effect is estimated to be a reduction of 0.0357 critical violations per inspection. Among all
restaurants, there were an average of 0.1056 critical violations per inspection during the pre-
announcement period, which makes the estimated average treatment effect quite substantial.
Estimates from the specification in column (2) project a pre-announcement average of 0.0955
critical violations per inspection among independent restaurants, suggesting that the LYP
led to a 37.38% relative decrease in critical violations per inspection.
This very large reduction in critical violations suggests that there may have been substan-
tial public health benefits associated with the LYP. Not only did independent restaurants
respond to the increased salience of hygiene information by improving health inspection
scores overall, they did so in part, by reducing some of the most serious health code viola-
tions. These results suggest that the LYP led to hygiene improvements among independent
restaurants that likely reduced the probability that diners would contract foodborne illness,
in a meaningful way.
19A complete list of critical violations can found at https://louisvilleky.gov/government/
health-wellness/about-restaurant-establishment-scores.
20A battery of parallel trends tests on critical violations, identical to those covered in Section 4.2, were
conducted. All tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that critical violations among independent and chain-
affiliated restaurants were on different trends prior to the announcement of the LYP. The results of these
tests are found in Tables A4, A5, and A6 in the Appendix.
21Poisson model estimates are provided in Table A7 of the Appendix. They are very similar to the
corresponding linear model estimates in sign, significance, and magnitude.
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5.3 The Effect of Information Salience Over Time
The initial results put forward in section 5.1 address the average treatment effect of the
LYP from July 1, 2013, through to January 8, 2016. In this subsection, I evaluate how the
effect of the LYP evolved over the course of the post-announcement period. There are two
reasons for examining the dynamics of the estimated treatment effect. First, a pertinent
question is whether the effect of the LYP on restaurant hygiene is more likely permanent or
temporary. If, after several post-announcement inspections, independent restaurants suspect
that their revenue is no more sensitive to health inspection scores than before, independent
restaurant hygiene may return to pre-announcement levels. Examining the evolution of the
estimated treatment effect may reveal whether this is occurring. For instance, if deducted
points among independent restaurants begin rising over later post-announcement inspec-
tions, it might indicate that the LYP’s effect is only temporary.
Second, a natural concern regarding my initial results is that they may be due to some
unobserved change which occurred within the post-announcement period. To the best of my
knowledge there were no other changes in the post-announcement period which would have
affected Louisville restaurant hygiene. Also note that, given the quasi-experimental design
of my empirical approach, for an unobserved coincident change to cause the initial results, it
would have to be something that affected independent restaurants only. Examining whether
the estimated effect of the LYP was immediate, gradual, delayed, or intermittent, can further
address this concern.
Recall that some of the critical violations listed earlier were food stored at incorrect tem-
peratures, improper disposal of waste, or improper dish washing. Other violations include
improper re-serving of food, bare-hand contact with ready-to-eat food, or food from an un-
approved source. I list such violations to highlight that they result from practices which
restaurants should be able to remedy quickly, if motivated to do so. Thus, if the estimates
presented in Table 5 indeed capture the causal effect of the LYP on restaurant hygiene, we
should expect to observe some effect in inspections immediately following the LYP announce-
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ment. Whereas, if the estimated effect develops intermittently, or is not evident until the
later inspections of the post-announcement period, it would raise concerns that the initial
results may be due to some unobserved factor.











This specification breaks the treatment effect down by each successive post-announcement
inspection. The parameter α0 is the change in expected DeductedP tsi,t for independent
restaurants going from the pre-announcement period to their first post-announcement inspec-
tion, minus the analogous change in expected DeductedP tsi,t for chain-affiliated restaurants.
Each successive parameter α1, . . . , α3, represents the change in expected DeductedP tsi,t
for independent restaurants going from their hth post-announcement inspection to their
(h+ 1)th, minus the analogous change in expected DeductedP tsi,t for chain-affiliated restau-
rants. The parameter α4 represents the change in expected DeductedP tsi,t for indepen-
dent restaurants going from their fourth post-announcement inspection to any subsequent
post-announcement inspections, minus the analogous change in expected DeductedP tsi,t for
chain-affiliated restaurants.22
Linear model estimates of equation (5) are presented in Table 7, and suggest a substan-
tial immediate decrease in point deductions among independent restaurants.23 Recall that
under the preferred specification, the estimated average treatment effect reported in Table
5 was a decrease in point deductions of 0.6706 (13.68 percent). Now, notice that this entire
effect is more than evident in independent restaurants’ first post-announcement inspections.
22Of the 1,259 restaurants in the sample, 940 (498 independent and 442 chain-affiliated) had a fifth
post-announcement inspection in the sample, but only 122 (46 independent and 76 chain-affiliated) had a
sixth post-announcement inspection. Because there are so few observations of a sixth post-announcement
inspection, α4 is defined as explained above.
23Poisson model estimates of equation (5) are presented in table A8 of the Appendix. All estimates are
similar to corresponding linear model estimates in sign, significance, and magnitude.
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Under the preferred specification reported in column (2) of Table 7, there is a statistically
significant estimated decrease in deducted points of 0.7774 among independent restaurants
in their first post-announcement inspections. These estimates project a pre-announcement
average of 4.9009 deducted points among independent restaurants, suggesting that the in-
creased salience of hygiene quality information caused an immediate 15.86 percent relative
decrease in deducted points among independent restaurants. Following that immediate im-
provement in inspection scores, deducted points among independent restaurants fluctuates
slightly from one inspection to the next, but none of these changes are significantly different
from zero.
Regarding the longevity of the treatment effect, the estimates presented in Table 7 pro-
vide no indication that the effect is temporary, and within the observed post-announcement
period, the effect is mostly permanent. Moreover, the stark improvement in independent
restaurant hygiene immediately following the announcement suggests that this effect is very
likely caused by the LYP, which provides further credibility to the initial average treatment
effect estimates.24
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Robustness to Alternative Comparison Groups
Recall that my initial raw data include observations on non-restaurant establishments.
To test the robustness of my main results to alternative comparison groups, I now include
observations from the following establishment types: child care facilities that serve food,
nursing home cafeterias, hospital cafeterias, office commissaries, hotels that serve food,25
24I also estimated equation (5) under the same three specifications, with the number of critical violations
per inspection replacing DeductedP tsi,t as the dependent variable. Under all specifications the average
treatment effect in the first post-announcement inspection is negative and relatively large, but none are
significantly differerent from zero at conventional significance levels.
25These are hotels that serve food directly to their guests. Restaurants within hotels were included in the
primary sample.
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retail food stores, and school cafeterias. Two aspects of these establishment types make
them a valid comparison group for independent restaurants. First, Yelp presently reports
health inspection results for Louisville restaurants only. These other establishment types, if
they have a Yelp profile at all, do not have any health inspection results published on their
profiles. Second, many of these other establishments don’t have Yelp profiles at all.
I begin testing the robustness of my main results to the inclusion of these additional
establishment types by estimating equation (1) under the preferred specification, with the
sample expanded to include these additional observations. Thus, chain-affiliated restaurants
together with these additional establishment types form the comparison group. I then repeat
that step with critical violations replacing deducted points as the dependent variable.
Next, I augment equation (1) as follows:
DeductedP tsi,t = β1(Posti,t × INDi) + β2(Posti,t × ChainResti)
+β3Posti,t + β4ti,t +Xi,t
′
β + bi + i,t.
(6)
Above, ChainResti is an indicator equal to 1 if establishment i is a chain-affiliated restaurant,
and equal to 0 otherwise. Under this specification, the non-restaurant establishments form
a comparison group for both chain-affiliated restaurants, and independent restaurants. I
estimate this equation under the preferred specification, and then re-estimate the equation
with critical violations replacing deducted points as the dependent variable. These estimates,
along with those discussed in the preceding paragraph are presented in Table 8. Notice
that across all four specifications, the average treatment effect estimates for independent
restaurants are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude to corresponding estimates from
the original sample.
6.2 Robustness to the Inclusion of Separate Trends
A further test of the parallel trends assumption and its validity, is to check whether
the estimated treatment effects are robust to the inclusion of separate trend variables for
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independent and chain-affiliated restaurants. This will account for any pre-existing difference
in trends which might confound treatment effect estimates. However, if the LYP is effective
in improving hygiene among independent restaurants, as my previous estimates suggest, the
resulting post-announcement observations will cause estimates of β3 to overstate any pre-
announcement difference in trends between independent and chain-affiliated restaurants.
This issue can be remedied by allowing for dynamic treatment effects as done in equation




[αh (Posti,t−h × INDi) + βhPosti,t−h]
+γ1 (INDi,t × ti,t) + γ2ti,t +Xi,t′γ + ci + i,t.
(7)
Estimates of equation (7) under the preferred specification and using the restaurants-
only sample, are reported in Table 9. Column (1) reports estimates of equation (7) as
shown above. Columns (2) and (3) report estimates of equation (7) with the trend vari-
able ti,t replaced by a quarter-year trend, Qi,t, and a half-year trend, Half i,t, respectively.
Across all three specifications, estimates of the average treatment effect remain statistically
significant and similar in magnitude to estimates without the inclusion of separate trends.
Moreover, on the trend variables that are specific to independent restaurants, none of the
coefficients are significantly different from zero. This provides further evidence that the av-
erage treatment effect estimates provided in Tables 5 and 7 do not the result of differences
in pre-announcement trends between independent and chain-affiliated restaurants.
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6.3 Placebo Tests Using Lead Indicators of the LYP Announce-
ment
As a final check on the underlying parallel trends assumption, as well as the robustness










I estimate equation (8) under the preferred specification four separate times with m =
1, . . . , 4. If coefficients on any of the leads of (Post× IND) are significantly different from
zero, it would suggest that at some point in the pre-announcement period, the paths of
DeductedP ts among independent and chain-affiliated restaurants diverged. This would call
into question whether deducted points among chain-affiliated restaurants provide a reason-
able counter-factual estimate for independent restaurants in the post-announcement period.
Estimates of equation (8) are presented in Table 10. All four columns report estimates
under the preferred specification. Notice that across all four columns, the estimated aver-
age treatment effect remains statistically significant and fairly close in magnitude to, albeit
slightly less than, the estimate reported in column (2) of Table 5. Notice also that across
all specifications, none of the estimated coefficients on any of the leads of (Post × IND)
are significantly different from zero. These results further support the parallel trends as-
sumption, and also suggest that the average treatment effect estimates reported in Table 5
identify the effect of the LYP on independent restaurant hygiene, and do not result from
a pre-announcement divergence in the paths of deducted points among independent and
chain-affiliated restaurants.
I also estimate equation (8) with critical violations per inspection replacing deducted
points as the dependent variable. These estimates are presented in Table 11. Again, all
four columns report estimates under the preferred specification. Across all four columns,
all estimates of the average treatment effect are very similar in magnitude to the estimate
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reported in column (2) of Table 6, but none of these estimates are significantly different
from zero at traditional significance levels. However, notice once again that across all four
specifications, none of the estimated coefficients on any of the leads of (Post × IND) are
significantly different from zero. This provides further evidence that the average treatment
effect estimates reported in Table 6 identify the effect the LYP on independent restaurant
hygiene, and do not result from a pre-announcement divergence in the paths of deducted
points among independent and chain-affiliated restaurants.
6.4 Addressing Inspector Assignment
Recall that the estimates in column (3) of Table 5 suggest that point deductions increase
significantly when restaurants face a different inspector than in their previous inspection.
Changes over time in how inspectors are assigned to restaurants could potentially confound
my treatment effect estimates. If, for whatever reason, independent restaurants faced dif-
ferent inspectors at a significantly lower frequency in the post-announcement period, then
some of the observed decreases in deducted points and critical violations over that period
might result from independent restaurants facing repeat inspectors more often, rather than
hygiene improvements.
I address these concerns by testing whether the probability of facing a different inspector
(than in the previous inspection), conditional on being an independent restaurant, decreased
in the post-announcement period. To do this, I specify the following linear model:
DiffInspectori,t = α1(Posti,t × INDi) + α2Posti,t +Xi,t
′
α+ ai + i,t. (9)
Under the null hypothesis that the probability of facing different inspector, conditional on
being an independent restaurant, decreases in the post-announcement period, α1 < 0. I
estimate equation (9) under three specifications. The first specification is simple difference-
in-differences. The second includes ti,t, logged number of seats, logged age of the restaurant,
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logged days elapsed, and fixed effects for zip code, opening year of the restaurant, day of
the week, and the inspector conducting the inspection. The third specification replaces all
time-invariant controls with restaurant fixed effects.
Estimates of equation (9) are presented in Table 12. Notice that all three specifications
reject the null hypothesis at the 99 percent significance level. This evidence suggests that,
among independent restaurants, the observed decreases in point deductions and critical
violations in the post-announcement period are not the result of a coincident decrease in
the frequency with which independent restaurants were assigned different inspectors (than
in their immediately preceding inspections). In fact, independent restaurants faced different
inspectors at a significantly greater frequency in the post-announcement period.
7 Concluding Remarks
Economic theory suggests a variety of conditions in which the reduction of information
asymmetries regarding product quality will induce sellers to increase the provision of prod-
uct quality. In practice, policies mandating the disclosure of product quality information
have become a popular tool for trying to induce such a salutary seller response. This seller
response will depend on the extent to which existing information asymmetries are reduced,
which might explain the existing mixed results regarding the effectiveness of mandatory dis-
closure policies in inducing sellers to improve product quality.26 In light of evidence that
information salience affects consumer decisions in many settings,27 a natural question is
whether seller response to mandatory disclosure policies is affected by the salience of the dis-
closed information. This question is especially pertinent as it relates to the product quality
of restaurant hygiene. Recall that foodborne illness, despite being largely preventable, is a
persistent public health concern in the United States. An estimated 48 million Americans
are made sick by foodborne illness annually, and restaurants are estimated to account for 60
26Jin and Leslie (2003) and Ho (2012).
27For instance, Chetty et al. (2009) , Bollinger et al. (2011), and Luca and Smith (2013).
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percent of all foodborne illness outbreaks in the US that have a single known food prepara-
tion source.
Utilizing a partnership between the city of Louisville and Yelp.com, this paper demon-
strates that the salience of disclosed information can substantially impact the response of
sellers to mandatory disclosure policies. In 2013, the city of Louisville began providing
restaurant health inspection data to the consumer-review forum Yelp.com, for publication
on their website. Because the data were already publicly available on the city’s website,
the partnership had no effect on the extent of restaurant hygiene information available to
consumers, but did increase the salience of this information for consumers who utilize Yelp
in deciding where to eat. Between independent and chain-affiliated restaurants, there is
an underlying disparity in the salience of information on Yelp. As demonstrated in Luca
(2016), consumer use of Yelp as a means for collecting restaurant information focuses mostly
on independent restaurants, because information about chain-affiliated restaurants is largely
conveyed through their chain’s reputation. I exploit this disparity in information salience
and find that the partnership resulted in significant and substantial hygiene improvements.
Among independent restaurants, I estimate that the partnership led to a 12 to 14 percent
decrease in inspection score point deductions, relative to pre-announcement levels. These
hygiene improvements occurred in restaurants’ first inspections following announcement of
the partnership, and were persistent throughout the post-announcement period. I also find
that the reduction in point deductions was partly driven by substantial (27 to 34 percent)
decreases in critical health code violations, which are the violations deemed the most haz-
ardous to diner health.
The estimated effects of the Louisville-Yelp partnership on independent restaurant hy-
giene show that increases in the salience of product quality information can induce sellers
to significantly improve product quality, even when this information has already been pub-
licly disclosed. From the perspective of sellers, it would appear that the simple disclosure of
product quality information on a government website or in an arbitrary public area is viewed
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very differently from the prominent display of such information in places where consumers
make purchase decisions.28 With regard to inducing quality improvement from sellers, my
findings demonstrate that information salience can have a substantial impact on the effec-
tiveness of mandatory disclosure policies. As such, information salience should be a major
consideration in the design of disclosure policies, and also appears to be an effective tool for
improving existing disclosure policies.
My results are particularly promising for local health departments seeing as the provision
health inspection data to Yelp is quite inexpensive. This is especially true for cities which
already collect and post this data on their own websites, and also when compared with the
costs of employing additional inspectors as a means of improving restaurant hygiene quality.
Since the adoption of the LYP, several other cities have entered into similar partnerships
with Yelp, and at present, a total of sixteen municipalities provide health inspection infor-
mation to Yelp through data feeds. The Louisville partnership is empirically advantageous
among these because the data were publicly available online well before the announcement of
the partnership with Yelp.29 My findings suggest that further adoption of such partnerships
between cities and Yelp could yield substantial public health benefits.
28This is not to say that the former has no effect on sellers, but rather that the latter can have a significant
additional effect the provision of product quality by sellers.
29Thus, the LYP provides a sufficient pre-announcement period to estimate the partnership’s effect, and
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Home   About Me   Write a Review   Find Friends   Messages   Talk   Events
Find chick­fil­a Near Louisville, KY
Figure 1: Top Page of an Establishment’s Yelp Profile
Notice that the establishment’s most recent health inspection score is found in the box at the lower









Date Inspection Type Violations Score
December 8, 2014 Routine 1 98
May 8, 2014 Routine 0 100
December 4, 2013 Routine 0 100
May 14, 2013 Routine 0 100
November 29, 2012 Routine 1 99
April 18, 2012 Routine 2 96






















Home   About Me   Write a Review   Find Friends   Messages   Talk   Events
Find tacos, cheap dinner, Max’s Near Louisville, KY
Figure 2: An Establishment’s Health Inspections Page
Visitors who click on the “Health inspection” hyperlink seen in Figure 1 are directed to this page.
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Figure 3: Overall Health Inspection Score given Critical and Non-critical Violations
Plot is from 11,399 inspections of 1,259 Louisville restuarants, effectively spanning January 2011
to January 2016. Green triangles mark inspections in which 0 critical violations were detected.
Orange diamonds mark inspections in which 1 critical violation was detected. Navy crosses mark
inspections in which 2 critical violations were detected. No inspections in the sample resulted in
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Figure 4: Distribution of Restaurant Health Inspection Scores
Plot is from 11,399 inspections of 1,259 Louisville restuarants, effectively spanning January 2011
to January 2016. Point deductions are from a maximum possible score of 100.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Deducted Points (per inspection)
All restaurants 11,399 4.5638 (4.3728) 0 36
Chain restaurants 4,992 4.1228 (4.1681) 0 36
Independent restaurants 6,407 4.9075 (4.4963) 0 36
Violations (per inspection)
All restaurants 11,399 2.9532 (2.2401) 0 15
Chain restaurants 4,992 2.6280 (2.1148) 0 15
Independent restaurants 6,407 3.2067 (2.3015) 0 15
Critical Violations (per inspection)
All restaurants 11,399 0.0888 (0.3530) 0 2
Chain restaurants 4,992 0.0857 (0.3430) 0 2
Independent restaurants 6,407 0.0912 (0.3606) 0 2
Total Inspections (by establishment)
All restaurants 1,259 9.0540 (1.3363) 3 17
Chain restaurants 534 9.3483 (1.2960) 4 17
Independent restaurants 725 8.8372 (1.3249) 3 12
Inspections Before (by establishment)
All restaurants 1,259 4.2732 (1.0181) 2 11
Chain restaurants 534 4.4120 (1.0244) 2 11
Independent restaurants 725 4.1710 (1.0019) 2 7
Inspections After (by establishment)
All restaurants 1,259 4.7808 (0.7317) 1 7
Chain restaurants 534 4.9363 (0.6567) 2 7
Independent restaurants 725 4.6662 (0.7628) 1 6
Number of Seats (by establishment)
All restaurants 1,259 88.061 (77.900) 1 483
Chain restaurants 534 81.257 (74.572) 1 450
Independent restaurants 725 93.073 (79.943) 1 483
“Inspections Before” reports the number of inspections in the final sample that a restaurant had
prior to the announcement of the LYP announcement. “Inspections After” reports the number of
inspections in the final sample that a restaurant had after the LYP announcement.
34





Independent Chain (Independent − Chain)
Mean Deducted Points Before 5.4101 4.3031 1.1070***
(0.1268) (0.1293) (0.1812)
Mean Deducted Points After 4.4582 3.9617 0.4965***
(0.1097) (0.1244) (0.1659)




***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Observations are from 11,399 inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 independent
and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and at least
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Figure 5: Deducted Points by Inspections Around the Policy Change
The horizontal axis represents the inspections around the announcment of the LYP, which is marked
by the dashed line. The 0 value indicates a restaurant’s last inspection before the announcement,
−1 indicates the restaurant’s second-to-last inspection before the anouncement, etc. The 1 value
indicates a restaurant’s first inspection after the announcement, 2 indicates a restaurant’s second
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Figure 6: Residual Deducted Points by Inspections Around the Policy Change
Residuals are from OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the number of points deducted
from a restaurant’s score in an inspection. Restaurant-specific controls are the establishment’s
logged number of seats, and indicators for the year in which the establishment opened, and the
restaurant’s zip code. Inspection-specific controls are the logged age of the restaurant at the time of
the inspection, and indicators for the day of the week, and the inspector conducting the inspection.
The horizontal axis represents the inspections around the announcment of the LYP, which is marked
by the dashed line. The 0 value indicates a restaurant’s last inspection before the announcement,
−1 indicates the restaurant’s second-to-last inspection before the anouncement, etc. The 1 value
indicates a restaurant’s first inspection after the announcement, 2 indicates a restaurant’s second
isnpection after the announcement, etc.
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Table 3: Tests of Parallel Trends by Inspection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
T×(Independent) -0.0979 -0.0920 -0.0890 -0.0722
(0.0879) (0.0888) (0.0940) (0.1395)
T -0.1392** -0.2332*** -0.2473*** -0.2268*
(0.0597) (0.0684) (0.0744) (0.1180)
Independent 1.4686*** 1.6198*** — —
(0.3596) (0.3591) — —
Intercept 4.7202*** -3.0767** 2.2540*** 3.4269
(0.2390) (1.5548) (0.8457) (2.5306)
ln(Seats) N Y N N
Zip Code FE N Y N N
Opening Year FE N Y N N
ln(Age) N Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N N Y Y
Day of Week FE N Y Y Y
Inspector FE N Y Y Y
DiffInspector N N N Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N N Y
R-squared 0.0184 0.1180 0.5097 0.5591
N 5,284 5,284 5,284 4,113
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Observations are from pre-announcement inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725
independent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant,
and given in parentheses.
T equals: 1 in a restaurant’s 5th, 2 in their 4th, 3 in their 3rd, 4 in their 2nd, and 5 in their last,
inspections before the announcement.
DiffInspector i,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the inspector conducting a restaurant’s t
th
inspection is different than the inspector who conducted their (t− 1)th inspection. Days Elapsed is
the number of days that elapsed between a restaurant’s tth inspection, and their (t− 1)th inspection.
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Table 4: Tests for Change in Trend: Chain-affiliated Restaurants Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
T×(Post) 0.0201 0.0122 0.0146 -0.0072
(0.0337) (0.0352) (0.0357) (0.0413)
T -0.0868* -0.1409** -0.1365** -0.0814
(0.0515) (0.0575) (0.0583) (0.0776)
ln(Seats) N Y N N
Zip Code FE N Y N N
Opening Year FE N Y N N
ln(Age) N Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N N Y Y
Day of Week FE N Y Y Y
Inspector FE N Y Y Y
DiffInspector N N N Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N N Y
R-squared 0.0016 0.1378 0.4095 0.4267
N 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,451
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Observations are from pre-announcement and post-announcement inspections conducted on 534
chain-affiliated restaurants that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and at least
one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and given in
parentheses.
T equals: 1 in a restaurant’s 5th inspection before the announcement, and 1 + n in their nth
inspection after that.
DiffInspector i,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the inspector conducting a restaurant’s t
th
inspection is different than the inspector who conducted their (t− 1)th inspection. Days Elapsed is
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Figure 7: Residual Deducted Points by Age of the Restaurant
Residuals are from OLS estimates with fixed effects for inspector, day of the week, and restaurant
included. The upper panel shows residuals among chain-affiliated restaurants only, and the lower
panel shows residuals among independent restaurants only.
The residuals are averaged by the age of the restaurant at the time of the inspection, among two
subgroups. The first subgroup, marked with navy circles, are restaurants that were the given age
before the announcement. The second subgroup, marked with maroon squares, were the given age
after the announcement.
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Table 5: Treatment Effect Estimates on Deducted Points: Linear Model
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
(Post)×(Independent) -0.6717*** -0.6706*** -0.6037***
(0.1529) (0.1554) (0.1637)
Post -0.1541 0.0115 -0.1444
(0.1666) (0.1665) (0.1744)
Independent 1.2264*** — —
(0.1847) — —
t -0.0743** -0.1167*** -0.0653*
(0.0322) (0.0323) (0.0386)
DiffInspector — — 0.5405***
— — (0.1083)
ln(Seats) Y N N
Zip Code FE Y N N
Opening Year FE Y N N
ln(Age) Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N Y Y
Day of Week FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N Y
R-squared 0.1032 0.4241 0.4370
N 11,399 11,399 10,140
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are OLS estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 inde-
pendent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and
at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and
given in parentheses.
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Table 6: Treatment Effect Estimates on Critical Violations: Linear Model
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Critical Violations Critical Violations Critical Violations
(Post)×(Independent) -0.0329** -0.0357** -0.0289*
(0.0134) (0.0140) (0.0149)
Post 0.0018 0.0127 -0.0049
(0.0141) (0.0159) (0.0164)
Independent 0.0327*** — —
(0.0120) — —
t -0.0059** -0.0089*** -0.0036
(0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0034)
DiffInspector — — 0.0145
— — (0.0102)
ln(Seats) Y N N
Zip Code FE Y N N
Opening Year FE Y N N
ln(Age) Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N Y Y
Day of Week FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N Y
R-squared 0.0261 0.1681 0.1795
N 11,399 11,399 10,140
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are OLS estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 inde-
pendent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and
at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and
given in parentheses.
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Table 7: Treatment Effect Estimates on Deducted Points Over Time: Linear Model
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
Postt × IND -0.7748*** -0.7774*** -0.7030***
(0.2283) (0.2340) (0.2390)
Postt−1 × IND 0.3147 0.3284 0.3135
(0.2644) (0.2776) (0.2790)
Postt−2 × IND -0.0872 -0.1061 -0.1286
(0.2451) (0.2558) (0.2586)
Postt−3 × IND 0.0081 -0.0119 0.0046
(0.2677) (0.2810) (0.2834)
Postt−4 × IND -0.5353* -0.4773 -0.4640
(0.3146) (0.3238) (0.3261)
Postt -0.0483 0.2451 0.1838
(0.2133) (0.2166) (0.2300)
Postt−1 -0.1418 -0.0754 -0.0687
(0.2045) (0.2159) (0.2229)
Postt−2 -0.0280 0.1194 0.1376
(0.1885) (0.1949) (0.2052)
Postt−3 (0.2011) 0.3605* 0.4092*
(0.2015) (0.2096) (0.2155)
Postt−4 0.2756 0.4603* 0.4499*
(0.2348) (0.2499) (0.2589)
ln(Seats) Y N N
Zip Code FE Y N N
Opening Year FE Y N N
ln(Age) Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N Y Y
Day of Week FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N Y
R-squared 0.1037 0.4253 0.4382
N 11,399 11,399 10,140
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are OLS estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 inde-
pendent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and
at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and
given in parentheses.
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Table 8: Treatment Effect Estimates with Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Deducted Points Crit. Violations Deducted Points Crit. Violations
Post× IND -0.5970*** -0.0299*** -0.5804*** -0.0286**
(0.1256) (0.0112) (0.1328) (0.0119)
Post× ChainRest — — 0.0450 0.0036
— — (0.1312) (0.0120)
Post -0.2565*** 0.0019 -0.2749*** 0.0005
(0.0961) (0.0091) (0.1042) (0.0099)
t -0.0540*** -0.0064*** -0.0535*** -0.0064***
(0.0192) (0.0017) (0.0193) (0.0017)
R-squared 0.4618 0.1791 0.4618 0.1791
N 21,115 21,115 21,115 21,115
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are OLS estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 indepen-
dent and 534 chain-affiliated) and 937 different non-restaurant establishments, that had at least
two inspections before the announcement, and at least one inspection after the announcement.
Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and given in parentheses.
All four columns report estimates with the inclusion of ti,t, and fixed effects for the restaurant being
inspected, the day of the week in which the inspection occurred, and the inspector conducting the
inspection.
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Table 9: Treatment Effect Estimates with Separate Trends: Deducted Points
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
Postt × IND -0.7009** -0.7637** -0.7291**
(0.3125) (0.3056) (0.3063)
Postt−1 × IND 0.3567 0.3340 0.3369
(0.2890) (0.2866) (0.2875)
Postt−2 × IND -0.0774 -0.1134 -0.0924
(0.2686) (0.2695) (0.2692)
Postt−3 × IND 0.0164 -0.0050 0.0167
(0.2951) (0.2930) (0.2950)
Postt−4 × IND -0.4454 -0.4964 -0.4838
(0.3351) (0.3349) (0.3327)
Postt 0.2028 0.1650 0.1373
(0.2389) (0.2306) (0.2318)
Postt−1 -0.0910 -0.1050 -0.1265
(0.2191) (0.2172) (0.2190)
Postt−2 0.1041 0.0749 0.0703
(0.1992) (0.2172) (0.2004)
Postt−3 0.3448 0.3416 0.3311
(0.2144) (0.2149) (0.2152)
Postt−4 0.4428* 0.3878 0.3758
(0.2517) (0.2520) (0.2505)
(Trend)×IND -0.0284 0.0024 -0.0074
(0.0810) (0.0377) (0.0759)
Trend -0.2022*** -0.0792*** -0.1721***
(0.0570) (0.0265) (0.0559)
Trend Variable t Q Half
R-squared 0.4253 0.4246 0.4248
N 11,399 11,399 11,399
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are OLS estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 inde-
pendent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and
at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and
given in parentheses.
All three columns report estimates with the inclusion of logged age, and fixed effects for the restau-
rant being inspected, the day of the week in which the inspection occurred, and the inspector
conducting the inspection.
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Table 10: Treatment Effect Estimates on Deducted Points with Leads of Post-announcement
Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
Postt × IND -0.5449** -0.5414** -0.5373** -0.5329**
(0.2344) (0.2345) (0.2344) (0.2344)
Postt 0.0136 -0.0292 -0.0959 -0.1529
(0.1916) (0.1951) (0.1974) (0.1992)
Postt+1 × IND -0.1666 -0.3060 -0.3064 -0.3065
(0.2358) (0.2909) (0.2909) (0.2909)
Postt+2 × IND — 0.2039 0.2800 0.2823
— (0.2650) (0.3108) (0.3107)
Postt+3 × IND — — -0.1439 -0.0286
— — (0.3146) (0.3308)
Postt+4 × IND — — — -0.3575
— — — (0.4347)
Postt+1 -0.1661 -0.0167 -0.0429 -0.0593
(0.1783) (0.2025) (0.2025) (0.2025)
Postt+2 — -0.2666 -0.1722 -0.1942
— (0.2004) (0.2306) (0.2301)
Postt+3 — — -0.2394 -0.1295
— — (0.2369) (0.2400)
Postt+4 — — — -0.3394
— — — (0.2948)
R-squared 0.4244 0.4245 0.4248 0.4253
N 11,399 11,399 11,399 11,399
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are OLS estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 inde-
pendent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and
at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and
given in parentheses.
All four columns report estimates with the inclusion of ti,t, and fixed effects for the restaurant being
inspected, the day of the week in which the inspection occurred, and the inspector conducting the
inspection.
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Table 11: Treatment Effect Estimates on Critical Violations with Leads of Post-
announcement Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Critical Violations Critical Violations Critical Violations Critical Violations
Postt × IND -0.0333 -0.0330 -0.0326 -0.0319
(0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0230)
Postt 0.0164 0.0130 0.0060 -0.0031
(0.0192) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0195)
Postt+1 × IND -0.0032 -0.0193 -0.0193 -0.0193
(0.0236) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287)
Postt+2 × IND — 0.0235 0.0462 0.0466
— (0.0254) (0.0312) (0.0312)
Postt+3 × IND — — -0.0409 -0.0286
— — (0.0329) (0.0350)
Postt+4 × IND — — — -0.0413
— — — (0.0478)
Postt+1 -0.0161 -0.0014 -0.0042 -0.0068
(0.0175) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0196)
Postt+2 — -0.0253 -0.0235 -0.0270
— (0.0181) (0.0225) (0.0225)
Postt+3 — — -0.0112 0.0096
— — (0.0253) (0.0263)
Postt+4 — — — -0.0624*
— — — (0.0329)
R-squared 0.1682 0.1684 0.1690 0.1710
N 11,399 11,399 11,399 11,399
Results are OLS estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 inde-
pendent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and
at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and
given in parentheses.
All four columns report estimates with the inclusion of ti,t, and fixed effects for the restaurant being
inspected, the day of the week in which the inspection occurred, and the inspector conducting the
inspection.
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Table 12: Assignment of a Different Inspector: Linear Probability Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Variable DiffInspector DiffInspector DiffInspector
(Post)×(Independent) 0.1085*** 0.0553*** 0.0507***
(0.0223) (0.0175) (0.0191)
Post 0.0316* 0.0267 0.0452**
(0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0182)
Independent -0.0853*** -0.0730*** —
(0.0198) (0.0145) —
Intercept 0.3546*** — —
(0.0153) — —
ln(Seats) N Y Y
Zip Code FE N Y Y
Opening Year FE N Y Y
ln(Age) N Y Y
Day of Week FE N Y Y
Inspector FE N Y Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N Y Y
Restaurant FE N N Y
R-squared 0.01240 0.3614 0.4806
N 10,140 10,140 10,140
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are OLS estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 inde-
pendent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement, and




Table A1: Tests of Parallel Trends by Quarter-year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
Q×(Independent) -0.0579 -0.0320 -0.0067 -0.0021
(0.0398) (0.0399) (0.0422) (0.0705)
Q -0.0669** -0.1242*** -0.1050*** -0.1310**
(0.0283) (0.0318) (0.0344) (0.0595)
Independent 2.4969** 2.0496** — —
(0.9942) (0.9916) — —
Intercept 5.9093*** -2.7167** — —
(0.7015) (1.2885) — —
ln(Seats) N Y N N
Zip Code FE N Y N N
Opening Year FE N Y N N
ln(Age) N Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N N Y Y
Day of Week FE N Y Y Y
Inspector FE N Y Y Y
DiffInspector N N N Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N N Y
R-squared 0.0182 0.1178 0.5080 0.5596
N 5,371 5,371 5,371 4,114
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Observations are from pre-announcement inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725
independent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. These observations begin in January 2011.
Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and given in parentheses.
DiffInspector i,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the inspector conducting a restaurant’s t
th
inspection is different than the inspector who conducted their (t− 1)th inspection. Days Elapsed is
the number of days that elapsed between a restaurant’s tth inspection, and their (t− 1)th inspection.
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Table A2: Tests of Parallel Trends by Half-year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
Half ×(Independent) -0.0755 -0.0327 -0.0065 0.0059
(0.0801) (0.0808) (0.0865) (0.1403)
Half -0.1396** -0.2312*** -0.2118*** -0.2398**
(0.0572) (0.0646) (0.0707) (0.1199)
Independent 2.0314** 1.6816*
(1.0142) (1.0159)
Intercept 6.0129*** -2.4745* — —
(0.7221) (1.2980) — —
ln(Seats) N Y N N
Zip Code FE N Y N N
Opening Year FE N Y N N
ln(Age) N Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N N Y Y
Day of Week FE N Y Y Y
Inspector FE N Y Y Y
DiffInspector N N N Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N N Y
R-squared 0.0174 0.1168 0.5078 0.5593
N 5,371 5,371 5,371 4,114
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Observations are from pre-announcement inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725
independent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. These observations begin in January 2011.
Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and given in parentheses.
DiffInspector i,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the inspector conducting a restaurant’s t
th
inspection is different than the inspector who conducted their (t− 1)th inspection. Days Elapsed is
the number of days that elapsed between a restaurant’s tth inspection, and their (t− 1)th inspection.
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Table A3: Treatment Effect Estimates on Deducted Points: Poisson Model
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
(Post)×(Independent) -0.1241*** -0.1269*** -0.1189***
(0.0350) (0.0326) (0.0342)
Post -0.0445 -0.0029 -0.0330
(0.0386) (0.0357) (0.0376)
Independent 0.2558*** — —
(0.0262) — —
t -0.0143** -0.0239*** -0.0141*
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0077)
DiffInspector — — 0.1189***
— — (0.0218)
ln(Seats) Y N N
Zip Code FE Y N N
Opening Year FE Y N N
ln(Age) Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N Y Y
Day of Week FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N Y
N 11,399 11,292 10,021
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are Poisson estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 in-
dependent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are robust to violation of the
equidispersion assumption, and given in parentheses.
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Table A4: Tests of Parallel Trends in Critical Violations by Inspection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Crit. Violations Crit. Violations Crit. Violations Crit. Violations
T×(Independent) -0.0053 -0.0051 -0.0066 -0.0006
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0136)
T -0.0112** -0.0168** -0.0151* -0.0127
(0.0056) (0.0067) (0.0078) (0.0115)
Independent 0.0398 0.0587* — —
(0.0308) (0.0320) — —
Intercept 0.1278*** -0.2554* — —
(0.0203) (0.1323) — —
ln(Seats) N Y N N
Zip Code FE N Y N N
Opening Year FE N Y N N
ln(Age) N Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N N Y Y
Day of Week FE N Y Y Y
Inspector FE N Y Y Y
DiffInspector N N N Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N N Y
R-squared 0.0032 0.03453 0.2832 0.3418
N 5,284 5,284 5,284 4,113
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Observations are from pre-announcement inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725
independent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are clustered by restaurant,
and given in parentheses.
PreT equals: 1 in a restaurant’s 5th, 2 in their 4th, 3 in their 3rd, 4 in their 2nd, and 5 in their last,
inspections before the announcement.
DiffInspector i,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the inspector conducting a restaurant’s t
th
inspection is different than the inspector who conducted their (t− 1)th inspection. Days Elapsed is
the number of days that elapsed between a restaurant’s tth inspection, and their (t− 1)th inspection.
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Table A5: Tests of Parallel Trends in Critical Violations by Quarter-year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Crit. Violations Crit. Violations Crit. Violations Crit. Violations
Q×(Independent) 0.0004 0.0014 0.0007 0.0041
(0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0071)
Q -0.0068** -0.0098*** -0.0067* -0.0098
(0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0059)
Independent 0.0094 0.0055 — —
(0.0947) (0.0984) — —
Intercept 0.2565*** -0.0330 — —
(0.0665) (0.1148) — —
ln(Seats) N Y N N
Zip Code FE N Y N N
Opening Year FE N Y N N
ln(Age) N Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N N Y Y
Day of Week FE N Y Y Y
Inspector FE N Y Y Y
DiffInspector N N N Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N N Y
R-squared 0.0028 0.0344 0.2799 0.3419
N 5,371 5,371 5,371 4,114
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Observations are from pre-announcement inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725
independent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. These observations begin in January 2011.
Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and given in parentheses.
DiffInspector i,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the inspector conducting a restaurant’s t
th
inspection is different than the inspector who conducted their (t− 1)th inspection. Days Elapsed is
the number of days that elapsed between a restaurant’s tth inspection, and their (t− 1)th inspection.
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Table A6: Tests of Parallel Trends in Critical Violations by Half-year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Crit. Violations Crit. Violations Crit. Violations Crit. Violations
Half ×(Independent) 0.0025 0.0042 0.0013 0.0081
(0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0092) (0.0142)
Half -0.0131** -0.0180*** -0.0136* -0.0159
(0.0056) (0.0067) (0.0076) (0.0120)
Independent -0.0107 -0.0136 — —
(0.0966) (0.1005) — —
Intercept 0.2550*** -0.0187 — —
(0.0688) (0.1163) — —
ln(Seats) N Y N N
Zip Code FE N Y N N
Opening Year FE N Y N N
ln(Age) N Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N N Y Y
Day of Week FE N Y Y Y
Inspector FE N Y Y Y
DiffInspector N N N Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N N Y
R-squared 0.0023 0.0338 0.2799 0.3415
N 5,371 5,371 5,371 4,114
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Observations are from pre-announcement inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725
independent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. These observations begin in January 2011.
Standard errors are clustered by restaurant, and given in parentheses.
DiffInspector i,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the inspector conducting a restaurant’s t
th
inspection is different than the inspector who conducted their (t− 1)th inspection. Days Elapsed is
the number of days that elapsed between a restaurant’s tth inspection, and their (t− 1)th inspection.
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Table A7: Treatment Effect Estimates on Critical Violations: Poisson Model
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Critical Violations Critical Violations Critical Violations
(Post)×(Independent) -0.3445** -0.4244*** -0.3849**
(0.1478) (0.1516) (0.1608)
Post 0.0250 0.1515 -0.0130
(0.1581) (0.1703) (0.1828)
Independent 0.3343*** — —
(0.1051) — —
t -0.0526** -0.0962*** -0.0472
(0.0259) (0.0303) (0.0378)
DiffInspector — — 0.1521
— — (0.1128)
ln(Seats) Y N N
Zip Code FE Y N N
Opening Year FE Y N N
ln(Age) N Y Y
Restaurant FE N Y Y
Day of Week FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N Y
N 11,399 4,614 3,806
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are Poisson estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 in-
dependent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are robust to violation of the
Poisson model’s equidispersion assumption, and given in parentheses.
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Table A8: Treatment Effect Estimates on Deducted Points Over Time: Poisson Model
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Deducted Points Deducted Points Deducted Points
Postt × IND -0.1530** -0.1529*** -0.1429***
(0.0605) (0.0511) (0.0519)
Postt−1 × IND 0.0779 0.0792 0.0727
(0.0768) (0.0623) (0.0620)
Postt−2 × IND -0.0134 -0.0127 -0.0143
(0.0746) (0.0593) (0.0592)
Postt−3 × IND -0.0029 -0.0162 -0.0130
(0.0770) (0.0637) (0.0636)
Postt−4 × IND -0.1276 -0.1246* -0.1194*
(0.0819) (0.0715) (0.0712)
Postt -0.0188 0.0406 0.0274
(0.0533) (0.0475) (0.0497)
Postt−1 -0.0391 -0.0282 -0.0212
(0.0629) (0.0503) (0.0512)
Postt−2 -0.0162 0.0086 0.0072
(0.0595) (0.0479) (0.0488)
Postt−3 0.0578 0.0848* 0.0929*
(0.0597) (0.0505) (0.0511)
Postt−4 0.0645 0.1034* 0.1032*
(0.0625) (0.0567) (0.0576)
ln(Seats) Y N N
Zip Code FE Y N N
Opening Year FE Y N N
ln(Age) Y Y Y
Restaurant FE N Y Y
Day of Week FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
ln(Days Elapsed) N N Y
N 11,399 11,292 10,021
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Results are Poisson estimates from inspections conducted on 1,259 different restaurants (725 in-
dependent and 534 chain-affiliated) that had at least two inspections before the announcement,
and at least one inspection after the announcement. Standard errors are robust to violation of the
Poisson model’s equidispersion assumption, and given in parentheses.
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